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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue
Appellee McFarland & Hullinger, LC (hereafter "McFarland & Hullinger"),
disagrees with the statement of the issue in the opening brief of appellants Thomas
Eleopulos and Cathy Atkin (hereinafter "Appellants"). The issue properly framed is:
Where Appellants' entire ownership interest in the allegedly
contaminated gravel pit has been terminated in an unrelated partition
action, was McFarland & Hullinger entitled to summary judgment on
Appellants' claims for breach of contract and waste, based on the
undisputed facts that Appellants suffered no economic loss when the
property was partitioned, Appellants have not incurred any costs to clean
up the alleged contamination, and no person or governmental agency has
made any demand on Appellants to clean up the alleged contamination.
Standard Of Review
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Because a summary judgment presents questions of law, the Court of Appeals
reviews the district court's ruling for correctness. Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 UT
App 75, 45 P. 3d 520.
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The issue was preserved for appeal in the district court in McFarland &
Hullinger's summary judgment motion papers and at oral argument. (R. 250-252,
253-352,496-510,540)
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
No determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations have been identified.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 1992, McFarland & Hullinger leased a gravel pit (the "Gravel Pit") in
Tooele County from the Morley Atkin Trust. Sometime during the lease term, all
of the Morley Atkin Trust property, including the Gravel Pit, became the property
of Morley Atkin's two daughters, Patsy Atkin and Cathy Atkin, as co-owners.
Cathy Atkin and her common law husband, Thomas Eleopulos ("Appellants"),
filed their complaint against McFarland & Hullinger asserting five causes of
action: (1) breach of contract; (2) waste; (3) conversion; (4) unjust enrichment;
and, (5) trespass. These five causes of action centered on three allegations of
wrongful conduct. First, Appellants averred that McFarland & Hullinger removed
more sand and aggregate from the Gravel Pit than it actually paid for. Second,
they averred that McFarland & Hullinger removed gold and silver from the Gravel
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Pit without permission and made no payment for its value. Third, they averred that
McFarland & Hullinger "dumped pollution" at the Gravel Pit.
The Course of Proceedings
McFarland & Hullinger filed its first Motion for Summary Judgment on
January 30, 2003 (R. 119-121). Appellants filed their opposing memorandum (R.
125-161) and a supplemental memorandum (R. 181-201) and McFarland &
Hullinger replied (R. 165-177). After a hearing, the district court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part. The district court entered summary judgment
in McFarland & Hullinger's favor on the unjust enrichment and conversion claims,
and on the contract claim insofar as it was based on the averments that McFarland
& Hullinger had not paid for all of the aggregate it removed from the Gravel Pit.
The district court found that there were disputed issues of fact concerning the
averments that McFarland & Hullinger had "dumped pollution" at the Gravel Pit.
Accordingly, the district court denied the motion with respect to Appellants'
claims for waste, trespass and breach of contract for the alleged pollution. An
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment was entered July 28, 2003. (R. 235237). This Order is not the subject of this appeal.
After the district court had entered an order in an unrelated partition action
between the two co-owner sisters, in Patsy Atkin v. Cathy Atkin, Civil No.
000300249, Third District Court, Tooele County, State of Utah, terminating
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Appellants' ownership interest in the Gravel Pit, McFarland & Hullinger filed its
second Motion for Summary Judgment on November 5, 2004 (R. 250-252). The
parties filed their respective memoranda (R. 377-403, 404-492, 496-510) and a
hearing was held.1 The transcript of the April 20, 2005 hearing on the second
summary judgment motion is found at R. 540. The district court granted
McFarland & Hullinger's motion for summary judgment and entered its Minute
Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment on February 7, 2005 (R. 520523), which was followed by entry of an Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment that was signed on February 28, 2005 and entered March 8,
2005 (R. 524-525). Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on March 25, 2005 (R.
526-528).
Statement of Relevant Facts 2
1.

In January 1992, the Morley T. Atkin Trust entered into a lease

("Gravel Pit Lease") with McFarland & Hullinger for the Gravel Pit in Tooele
County. The term of the Gravel Pit Lease was 9lA years commencing on January
2, 1992, and ending on June 30, 2001. (Lease, R. 315-324); Cathy Atkin Depo. at
8:3-9 (R. 326-332); Complaint f 6 (R. 2-16).

1

Appellants did not oppose the dismissal of their trespass claim.
2
Appellants did not dispute any of the material facts set forth by McFarland &
Hullinger in its motion papers: "As a general statement, the recited facts are not in
dispute for purposes of this motion." See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment at p. 2 (R. 492).
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2.

Cathy Atkin and her sister Patsy Atkin are the daughters of Morley T.

Atkin, deceased. As beneficiaries of the Morley Atkin Trust, they received coownership interests in the Gravel Pit. The Gravel Pit was part of a larger parcel of
property, referred to as the a Hwy 36 property," that the sisters received from the
Trust. Cathy Atkin Depo. at pp. 10, 51-53. (R. 326-332). Minute Entry and Order
on Motion for Summary Judgment at % 2(a) (R. 520-523).
3.

In March 2000, Patsy Atkin sued her sister, Cathy Atkin, in order to

partition their co-ownership in all of the property from the Morley Atkin Trust,
including the Hwy 36 property. Patsy Atkin v. Cathy Atkin, Civil No. 300249,
Third District Court, Tooele County, State of Utah (the "Partition Action"). See
Verified Petition for Partition of Real Property (R.284-288).
4.

In the fall of 2001, Patsy and Cathy Atkin reached an oral agreement

to partition and divide their Hwy 36 property. They agreed to divide the property
along north-south lines. Patsy Atkin was to receive the Gravel Pit on the south end
of the Hwy 36 property, and Cathy Atkin was to receive the north end of the Hwy
36 property where she resides. Patsy Atkin Affidavit at Tf 5 (R.279-282).
5.

On September 19, 2001, Cathy and Patsy Atkin signed a written

agreement, consistent with their oral agreement, to equally divide their Hwy 36
property. Cathy Atkin agreed that she was to receive the north parcel and Patsy
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Atkin was to receive the south parcel, including the Gravel Pit. The Agreement for
Partition Stipulation and Order is found in the record at R. 270-277.
6.

On October 12, 2001, appellants Cathy Atkin and Tom Eleopulos

("Appellants") filed their complaint against McFarland & Hullinger. Complaint (R.
2-16).
7.

On September 23, 2003, the Atkin sisters' Partition Action went to

trial. As plaintiff, Patsy Atkin offered her Exhibit 6 (R. 268), which was a handdrawn map designating a proposed division of all of the Morley Atkin Trust
property, including a division of the Hwy 36 property into two parcels along a
north-south boundary with each parcel having equal frontage to Highway 36. a The
gravel pits" are identified in the south portion of the property, in which Patsy Atkin
was to receive a 100% interest.
8.

On March 1, 2004, the court entered its Amended Order of Partition in

the Partition Action. The court partitioned the Hwy. 36 property according to
Exhibit 6. According to her request, Patsy Atkin was awarded the south portion,
which includes the Gravel Pit, free and clear of any lien, right or obligation to
Cathy Atkin. Cathy Atkin received the north portion. This ruling was consistent
with the expressed desire of Cathy Atkin, who requested the north portion where
she resides. Consequently, Appellants no longer have any ownership interest in
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the Gravel Pit. Partition Action Amended Order of Partition (R. 262-266);
Partition Action, Hearing Transcript (ruling only) September 26, 2003 (R. 253260); Minute Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at % 2(c). (R.
520-523); Summary Judgment Motion Hearing Transcript, February 2, 2005 at p. 4
-8 (R. 540).
9.

There was no evidence in the Partition Action, which partitioned the

Hwy 36 property into equal halves, that Patsy Atkin's south parcel, including the
Gravel Pit, suffered any diminution in value. What made the partition of Patsy and
Cathy Atkin's respective parcels equal, and thus equitable, in the view of the
district court, was the fact that each parcel had the same amount of frontage on
Highway 36. Partition Action Amended Order of Partition (R. 262-266); Partition
Action, Hearing Transcript (ruling only) September 26, 2003 (R. 253-260); Minute
Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at f 2(c). (R. 520-523);
Summary Judgment Motion Hearing Transcript, February 2, 2005 at p. 4 -8 (R.
540).

3

It has never been clear what interest, if any, appellant Thomas Eleopulos
claimed in the Hwy 36 property. Nevertheless, the intention and result of the
Partition Action was to partition the Morley Atkin Trust property between the two
Atkin sisters, free and clear of any competing interests.
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10.

In an accounting she filed in the Partition Action, Cathy Atkin

acknowledged that she never incurred any expenses associated with McFarland &
Hullinger's alleged "pollution" of the Gravel Pit, other than fees associated with
expert witnesses retained by her attorneys in the above-entitled action. See Cathy
Atkin Accounting (R. 290-293).
11.

No action or order by any private, local, state or federal entity has

been instituted for cleanup of the Gravel Pit, and Appellants have not been sued or
named as a party responsible for any cleanup action of the Gravel Pit. Minute
Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at f 2(d) (R. 520-523).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
While there is no dispute that McFarland & Hullinger signed a written lease
with the Morley T. Atkin Trust to lease the Gravel Pit, neither a breach of the
lease, nor McFarland & Hullinger's alleged waste, was established in the district
court; rather, the district court merely assumed these facts for purposes of deciding
McFarland & Hullinger's summary judgment motion because these facts were
immaterial to the motion.
McFarland & Hullinger makes three related arguments in this brief. First,
regardless of whether McFarland & Hullinger breached its lease and committed
waste, the Gravel Pit was part of the south portion of the Hwy 36 property, and
100% ownership of the south portion of the Hwy 36 property was transferred to
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Patsy Atkin in the Partition Action. Patsy Atkin makes no claim in this lawsuit.
When Judge Skanchy partitioned the Hwy 36 property the only issue that
concerned him, and the only issue raised by the Atkin sisters, was that each sister
receive equal frontage along Hwy 36. Whether or not the Gravel Pit was
contaminated, Appellants each took an equal half of the Hwy 36 property without
any diminution in value or loss of any kind on account of the alleged
contamination of the Gravel Pit. Appellants no longer own the Gravel Pit, they
never incurred any costs to clean it up, and no one has ever made a demand on
them to do so. Consequently, the necessary element of loss or damages is missing
from Appellants' breach of contract and waste claims.
McFarland & Hullinger's related second and third arguments are that
Appellants' claims are not ripe and Appellants lack standing. Appellants' claim
that some day in the future they may be called upon to clean up the Gravel Pit is
purely speculative and fails to raise the requisite justiciable case or controversy and
particularized injury which are necessary to maintain a lawsuit.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS SUFFERED NO LOSS WHEN THE DISTRICT
COURT PARTITIONED THE HWY 36 PROPERTY WITHOUT ANY
CONSIDERATION FOR APPELLANTS' CLAIM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION,
This lawsuit is about the Gravel Pit in Tooele County that McFarland &

Hullinger leased from the Morley Atkin Trust in 1992. The Gravel Pit at issue in
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this case is located in the south half of a larger parcel of property, referred to as the
"Hwy 36 property," which was owned by the Morley Atkin Trust, and thereafter
co-owned by Morley Atkin's daughters, Cathy Atkin and Patsy Atkin.4
A year before the present lawsuit was filed, Patsy Atkin sued her sister
Cathy Atkin in Third District Court in Tooele County to partition all of the
property that had been left to them by their father, including the Hwy 36 property.
Patsy Atkin v. Cathy Atkin, Civil No. 300249, Third District Court, Tooele County,
State of Utah (the "Partition Action").5 Patsy filed an affidavit in the Partition
Action stating that "[I]n the fall of 2001, an oral agreement was reached with
[Cathy] and her attorney, Dennis Morell [sic], of Kirton and McConkie, to partition
and divide the [Hwy 36] property. By virtue of the agreement, the property was to
be divided among [sic] north-south lines and I would receive the operating gravel
pit on the south end of the property. [Cathy] stated that I could do as I please with
this property as she and Tom Eleopolus were residing on the north end."6

4

Patsy Atkin has never made a claim against McFarland & Hullinger and is not a
party to this action.
5
McFarland & Hullinger's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 253-352), contains all of the relevant papers from the
Partition Action, including the September 26, 2003 trial transcript (ruling only) (R.
260), and the Amended Order of Partition (R. 266). The trial transcript and the
Amended Order of Partition are also included in the Addendum to this brief at
Tabs D and E.
6
Patsy Atkin Affidavit at 1 5 (R. 282).
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In October 2001, while the Partition Action was pending, Appellants sued
McFarland & Hullinger. Their averments that are relevant to this appeal were that
McFarland & Hullinger had "dumped pollution" on the Gravel Pit, thus allegedly
breaching the Gravel Pit Lease and committing waste.
The partition action went to trial in September 2003. At trial, Patsy
proposed a division of the Hwy 36 property that she illustrated with a map marked
as her Exhibit 6. Patsy's proposal was to divide the Hwy 36 property as she and
Cathy had previously decided; Patsy would get the south parcel, including the
Gravel Pit property, and Cathy would get the north parcel where she lived, which
is exactly what Cathy had always wanted. The district court adopted Patsy's
proposal.8 When the district court partitioned the Hwy 36 property, the district
court gave no consideration to the fact that the south parcel awarded to Patsy Atkin
might be the site of alleged "dumped pollution," nor that such alleged "dumped
pollution" affected the relative values of the north and south parcels. What made

7

Included in Addendum at Tab C.
Judge Skanchy presided over both the Partition Action and the present case.
He, therefore, understood better than anyone else what factors he had considered in
partitioning the Hwy 36 property. At the hearing on McFarland & Hullinger's
motion for summary judgment, Judge Skanchy countered Appellants' contention
that any supposed stigma associated with the Gravel Pit was a factor in dividing
the property equally between the Atkin sisters. See Hearing Transcript, February
2, 2005 at p. 8. (R. 540).
8
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the two parcels equal, and thus equitable, according to the district court, was the
fact that each parcel had equal frontage on Highway 36.9
A soon as the district court partitioned the Hwy 36 property and it was
apparent that Patsy and Cathy had received their respective north and south halves
of the Hwy 36 property without any consideration of Appellants' allegations that
the Gravel Pit was contaminated, McFarland & Hullinger moved for summary
judgment. The timing was appropriate: (1) Appellants no longer owned any
interest in the Gravel Pit; (2) Appellants' allegations of environmental
contamination or stigma damages did not affect the valuation of the property for
partition purposes; (3) Appellant Cathy Atkin had filed an accounting in the
Partition Action demonstrating that she had never incurred any costs to clean up
the alleged contamination; and (4) no person or governmental entity had ever made
a demand on Appellants to clean up the alleged contamination of the Gravel Pit.
In other words, after the district court partitioned the Hwy 36 property
equally between the sisters without any mention (by Cathy Atkin, Patsy Atkin, or
by anyone else) of any alleged contamination of the Gravel Pit, and Appellants'
ownership interest in the Gravel Pit was entirely terminated, Appellants' allegation
that McFarland & Hullinger "dumped pollution" at the Gravel Pit was immaterial.
Whether or not McFarland & Hullinger "dumped pollution" on the Gravel Pit,

See Hearing Transcript, 9/26/03 (R. 260).
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Appellants suffered no damages under their breach of contract and waste claims,
their claims were not ripe for adjudication, and they had no standing to maintain
their lawsuit. Consequently, for purposes of this summary judgment motion only,
the district court could assume, arguendo, that the "dumped pollution" allegations
were true and that all other material facts were undisputed.
Elements of a Contract Claim
"The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are: (1) a contract;
(2) performance by the party seeking recovery; (3) breach of the contract by the
other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., et al, 20 P.3d 388,
392 (Utah 2001).10
Damages for breach of contract seek to place the aggrieved party in the
same economic position the party would have been in had the contract been
performed. Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999); Young Electric Sign
Company v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988).

10

The basis for Appellants' breach of contract claim was a provision in the
Gravel Pit Lease that reads:
2.3 Compliance with Laws. LESSEE agrees during the term of this
Lease, at its expense, to obtain and maintain in effect all necessary permits
and to comply with all applicable, valid statutes, regulations and orders of all
governmental bodies having jurisdiction over LESSEE or the Leased
Premises.
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Elements of a Waste Claim
Waste is a species of tort that has three elements: (1) an act constituting
waste; (2) done by one legally in possession; (3) to the prejudice of the estate or
interest therein of another. Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing
Company, Inc., 888 P. 2d 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Hansen v. Green River
Group, 748 P. 2d 1102, 1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Jowdy v. Guerin, 457
P. 2d 745 (Az. App. 1969)).
The measure of damages for waste is the difference in market value before
and after the injury, or alternatively, the cost of remediation. Jowdy v. Guerin, 457
P. 2d 745 (Az. App. 1969).
Even assuming, for argument's sake only, that McFarland & Hullinger had
breached the Gravel Pit Lease, Appellants' economic position was ultimately no
different than if McFarland & Hullinger had not allegedly "dumped pollution."
Cathy and Patsy Atkin received equal halves of the Hwy 36 property with equal
frontage to Hwy 36 without any consideration of Appellants' claims of pollution.
Although Appellants asserted that McFarland & Hullinger was not entitled to
summary judgment because the partition was skewed as a result of stigma
associated with the Gravel Pit, Judge Skanchy knew better.11 He had, after all, just

11

See Tr. 2/02/05 at p. 8 (R. 540).
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partitioned the Hwy 36 property, and he knew that stigma had nothing to do with
the partition.
Importantly, the only costs Appellants ever incurred relative to the "dumped
pollution," on what is now Patsy Atkin's Gravel Pit property, are costs Appellants
incurred for analysis of samples taken from the Gravel Pit area after Cathy Atkin
had already decided to acquire the north half of the Hwy 36 property where her
trailer is located (not the Gravel Pit area). No regulatory agency has ever
demanded that the Gravel Pit be cleaned up, nor has Patsy ever made such a
demand on her sister (or on McFarland & Hullinger, for that matter). The only
reason Appellants spent anything for sampling and analysis was for the purpose of
securing expert testimony in support of their breach of contract and waste claims
against McFarland & Hullinger in this lawsuit. The costs for their expert witnesses
are not recoverable damages. Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison,
2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35 (holding that any amount paid for an expert witness over
the statutory allowance is an expense of litigation, rather than a taxable cost, and
not recoverable).
Contract damages necessarily require an evaluation of the non-breaching
party's loss by the most direct, practical and accurate method. Even Odds, Inc v.
Nielson, 448 P. 2d 709 (Utah 1968). It is axiomatic that when there is no loss,
there are no damages. Appellants suffered no loss. Damages, therefore, were an
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essential, but missing, element to Appellants' breach of contract claim. See Bair v.
Axiom Design, L.L.C., et aL, 2001 UT 20, 20 P.3d 388, 392.
Appellants' claim for waste suffered from the same defect as their breach of
contract claim. There was no difference in the market value of the Gravel Pit
before and after the alleged "dumping," as demonstrated by the district court's
equal division of the Hwy 36 property, and Appellants have no costs of
remediation.
IL

APPELLANTS' CLAIMS WERE NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION,
A district court can only decide those claims that are ripe for adjudication.

Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P. 2d 1138, 1148 (Utah
1981). A justiciable controversy must presently exist, and a claim that is based on a
hypothetical situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find
themselves, is unripe for adjudication. See Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P. 2d 741
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT 254, 97 P. 3d 722.
Appellants have always been unable to dispute the simple fact that no one
has ever suggested that they are liable to clean up Patsy Atkin's Gravel Pit
property. Appellants simply assert, hypothetically, that they might suffer liability
in the future under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),
42 U.S.C. § 6972, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., or the Utah Solid
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and Hazardous Waste Act, Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-101, etseq. No enforcement
action was ever filed against Appellants under any of these statutes or their
implementing regulations. Indeed, no federal, state or municipal governmental
entity or any citizens group filed, or even threatened to file, any enforcement action
against Appellants in regard to the Gravel Pit property. In addition, Appellants are
now past owners, rather than current owners, of the Gravel Pit.
It is highly unlikely that an enforcement action would be brought by the
State of Utah against Appellants under the state statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6112, 19-6-113, and 19-6-821 and implementing regulations) because these statutes
apply to enforcement actions brought by the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control
Board against "any person [who] is in violation of any applicable approved
hazardous wastes operation plan or solid waste plan'5 or the Board's applicable
requirements and rules. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-112(1). There is no provision for
enforcement against an innocent, past landowner. Since Appellants never alleged
that they personally violated any hazardous waste operation plan or solid waste
plan, it is highly unlikely that an action would be brought against them under these
state statutes.
A prior owner can, potentially, be liable under RCRA, but the past owner of
a treatment, storage, or disposal facility must have "contributed or ... is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
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disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 U.S.C.
§6972(a)(1)(B). Again, since Appellants never alleged that they personally
contributed to any past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste, it is highly unlikely that an enforcement
action would be brought against them under RCRA. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has foreclosed RCRA cost recovery actions with respect to past
cleanup costs. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
Appellants could potentially be defendants in a CERCLA action, along with
other owners, operators, generators, and transporters, if it could be shown that they
owned the subject property "at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance"
(42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)), but the federal court with exclusive jurisdiction over
such enforcement action would have to find and allocate liability to Appellants, as
opposed to other potentially responsible parties, and if Appellants were found to be
liable, they would then have the opportunity to bring a contribution action against
other potentially responsible parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). In resolving the
contribution action, the federal court would allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the court determined appropriate. Id.
Consequently, Appellants would have their day in court to seek contribution from
responsible parties.
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In summary, no enforcement action has been brought against Appellants
under the enforcement provisions of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act,
RCRA, or CERCLA, and it is highly unlikely that such an enforcement action will
ever be brought. If an enforcement action were brought, Appellants could require
that other potentially responsible parties be joined, and the appropriate court would
have to decide Appellants' liability. Appellants could even bring a subsequent
contribution action under CERCLA. None of this, of course, has ever happened
and such potential enforcement action is purely speculative.
III.

APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS
LAWSUIT.
A district court can only adjudicate an actual case or controversy. A

plaintiff must establish standing in order to maintain a claim before a trial court.
The general standing rule, often stated by the Utah Supreme Court, is that "a
plaintiff must have suffered 'some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or
her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.'" Society of Professional
Journalist v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987) (quoting Jenkins v. Swan,
675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (alteration in original)). Anyone bringing an
original proceeding must satisfy the traditional standing test. Society, 743 P.2d at
1170. The traditional standing requirement is generally justified on the grounds
that, in the absence of such a requirement, the courts might permit themselves to be
drawn into disputes that are not fit for judicial resolution, such as hypothetical
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issues or advisory opinions. Id. Likewise, a party cannot raise the hypothetical
claims of third parties who are not before the court. Provo City Corp. v.
Thompson, 2004 UT 14 ^9, 86 P.3d 735.
It is clear, based on the undisputed facts, that Appellants lacked standing to
assert a claim for cleaning up Patsy Atkin's Gravel Pit property when no cleanup
has yet occurred, no cleanup has ever been scheduled, and where, importantly,
neither the owner of the property, Patsy, nor any governmental agency, has ever
demanded that the property be cleaned up. In a comparable standing case decided
by the Utah Court of Appeals, the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing in a
dispute over ownership of stock when the plaintiff had sold her interest in the stock
and no longer held a personal stake in the outcome of the ownership dispute. See
Granite Stone L.C. v. Allen, 2004 WL 2690778, 2004 UT App 435.
Appellants have no present damages under their breach of contract and
waste claims; however, they asked the district court to decide a hypothetical
environmental enforcement case in which the enforcement agency, the
enforcement mechanism, the potentially responsible parties, the remedy, and the
damages are unknown. Obviously, Appellants lacked the "particularized injury"
which is specifically required by Utah courts for standing to maintain a lawsuit.

351382 l.DOC

20

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, the district court's Order Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed.
DATED this 14th day of October, 2005.

Rosemary J. Beless
P. Bruce Badger
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
McFarland & Hullinger, LC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of October, 2005,1 caused to be
deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct
copies of BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following counsel of record:
Gregory J. Sanders
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, 4 Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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Third Judicial District

FEB - 1 2005
TOOELE COUNTY

By.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS ELEOPULOUS and
CATHY ATKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MINUTE ENTRY and
ORDER on MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case no. 010301120

McFARLAND AND HULLINGER, LLC
and DOES I-X,
Defendants.

Judge RANDALL N. SKANCHY

This Court, having heard argument Defendant McFarland and Hullinger's (Defendant)
Motion for Summary Judgment on February 2, 2005, with P. Bruce Badger and Rosemary Beless
appearing on behalf of Defendant and Gregory T. Sanders appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs
Thomas Eleopulous and Cathy Atkin (PlaintiflFs) and having received and reviewed briefs in the
matter, finds and orders as follows:
1)

Plaintiffs' claim for trespass is dismissed as Plaintiffs have voluntarily abandoned

that claim.
2)

Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and waste are likewise dismissed without

prejudice. The Court bases its dismissal of these claims on the following undisputed facts:
a)

Cathy Atkins and her sister, Patsy Atkins, received an interest in the subject
property ("Gravel Pit property") as beneficiaries of the Morley T. Atkin
Trust. The Gravel Pit property was part of a larger parcel of property the
sisters received from this Trust.

r.nr,oo

b)

The Defendants leased the Gravel Pit property during the sisters joint
interest in the property. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants breached the
lease and committed acts constituting waste on the Gravel Pit property.

c)

Cathy and Patsy Atkin were adverse parties to a partition action filed in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County entitled Patsy Atkin
v. Cathy Atkin, civil no. 020300249. On or about Sepetember 23, 2003,
the larger parcel of property was partitioned pursuant to a trial.
Thereafter, on March 1, 2004, this Court entered an Order partitioning the
property, which Order granted Patsy Atkin the Gravel Pit Property free and
clear of any lien, right or obligation to Cathy Atkin. This ruling was
consistent with the expressed desire of Cathy Atkin as to which parcel of
the larger parcel she desired. Atkin and co-plaintif£ Eleopulous, have no
ownership interest in the Gravel Pit property. There was no evidence that
Patsy Atkin incurred a dimunition in value when the larger parcel was
partitioned.

d)

No action or order by any private, local, state or federal entity has been
instituted for clean-up of the Gravel Pit property and Cathy Atkin has not
been sued or named as a party responsible for clean-up action as to the
Gravel Pit property.

3)

A breach of contract claim requires four essential elements of proof, one of which

is damages. Breach of contract damages seek to place the aggrieved party in the same economic
position she would have had if the contract was not breached. Mahmoodv. Ross, 990 P.2d 933
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
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(Utah 1999). Similarly, a waste claim requires three elements of proof, one of which is prejudice
to the estate or interest of another. Waste damages may be measured by the either the cost of
restoration or the difference in market value before and after the injury. Dugan v. Jones, 724
P.2d 955 (Utah 1986).
4)

Even assuming for purposes of this motion for summary judgment that the

Defendant breached the contract and/or committed acts constituting waste, to defeat summary
judgment, the PlaintiflFs must show damage and/or prejudice to their interest in the Gravel Pit
property. Here, the PlaintiflFs fail to show any genuine issue of material fact regarding damages or
prejudice to their interest. The PlaintiflFs have suffered no economic loss from the Defendant's
breach. While damages may occur in the future if the PlaintiflFs are held liable for clean-up costs
or otherwise, presently no such damages exist, and as such neither their breach of contract nor
waste claims are ripe for adjudication. Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722 (Utah 2004). While there
may have been a difference in market value before and after the injury, such dimunition in value of
the larger parcel was not raised by PlaintiflFs as damage. Furthermore, Cathy chose not to keep
the portion of the larger parcel that included the Gravel Pit property, therefore, she will not bear
the burden of the dimunition in value of the property, if any.
ORDER
The Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and ORDERS:
1)

the PlaintiflFs' trespass claim DISMISSED with prejudice; and

2)

the PlaintiflFs' breach of contract and waste claims DISMISSED without prejudice;

3)

the Defendants Counsel to prepare an Order for this Court to sign reflecting this
Minute Entry and Order.

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
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DATED this ^£_ day of February, 2005.
By the Court:
<SS5 ,:

RANDAL!, K S
Third pistrict Court Judge
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Rosemary J. Beless (A0272)
P. Bruce Badger (A4791)
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801)531-8900
Facsimile: (801)531-1716
Attorneys for Defendant McFarland & Hullinger, LC

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS ELEOPULOUS and CATHY
ATKIN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

McFARLAND AND HULLINGER, LLC
and DOES I-X„

)
)
)

Civil No. 010301120
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendants.
Defendant McFarland and Hullinger, LC's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing on February 2, 2005. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Gregory J. Sanders.
Defendant McFarland and Hullinger, LC was represented by its counsel, P. Bruce Badger and
Rosemary J. Beless. The Court having read and considered the supporting and opposing motion
papers, and having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised, now enters its
Order consistent with its Minute Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated
February 7, 2005.

334179_1.DOC

rntror

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted:
1.

Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action for breach of contract is dismissed without

2.

Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for waste is dismissed without preiudice;

3.

Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for trespass is dismissed with preiudice.

prejudice;

DATED this

£%

day of _

f

P*N»>

T

_, 2005

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Randall iz. Skanchy
Third District CourT 1 '
Approved as to form:

Gregory p ^afnclers
Kipp and Christian
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Thomas Eleopulous
and Cathy Atkin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the ft '-~ day of February 2005,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Gregory J. Sanders
Margaret R. Wakeham
Kipp and Christian, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 000300249

PATSY ATKIN,
Plaintiff,
v
CATHY ATKIN,
Defendant.

'RULING ONLY FOR HEARING SEPTEMBER 26,2003*
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE RANDALL SKANCHY

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

COPY

TOOELE, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 26,2003
JUDGE RANDALL SKANCHY PRESIDING
*PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - RULING ONLY*

THE COURT:

The survey assists in that particular

case, at least to know that.

I ask that only because frankly,

having heard all of the testimony I'm inclined to accept the
proposal that exists in front of me today as I look on this
sheet, at least as far as the north and the south portions are
concerned.

It seems equitable for a number of reasons, not the

least of which is it attempts to coincide with the desires of
Kathy Atkin to not have the gravel pit and to make some
accommodation for that, otherwise it seems to me to be an
entirely equitable split.

The argument that the frontage road

should be equally divided is compelling to me, I mean this is
access

that creates access to property and that seems to be

another driving reason why I believe equity would require to be
split, having said all of that.

If a survey will need to be

done anyway, creates some opportunity to - this is what we're
going to do.

I don't see it making a difference in terms of

the arguments that were presented today or the testimony for
purposes of trying to create equity here and so I'm going to
require, number one, that there be a survey completed.

A

survey based on the rough outlines as set forth for the north
and south portions of the property as identified on the
exhibit-

f rior.n

1

Did this come in as a exhibit or is this?

2

MR, ?:

3

TfiE COURT: I don't think we've ever admitted this

It's six I think.

i4

larger document.

Oh, it came in as a smaller version.

5

MR. ?:

6

THE COURT:

On our version Exhibit 6.
Alright, along the confines for the north

7

and south portion as represented in Exhibit 6, the parties to

8

equally shax~e the costs associated with that survey.

9

take about the survey as it relates to other pieces of

10
11

We'll

property.
The Court intends by this survey to make this

12

division equal, both on the frontage that exists to both of the

13

properties as well as insuring that the gravel pits are on the

14

south portion as opposed to the north portion, and also

15

incorporates into the north portion, which the Court would

16

award to Cathy, the town property piece.

17

I'm going to require as access to mining claims that

18

both of the parties have availability from the north portion

19

for access to those mining claims.

20

mining claims down the middle, each party to take four, given

21

the fact that we have no value testified here today and I have

22

no ability to make a comparison between the foothill or

23

mountain property versus the mining claim property to see if

24

they're roughly equivalent.

25

if they'd been testimony to provide that, the Court may have

I'm going to split the

If they were roughly equivalent or

2
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looked in another direction, but in view of the fact that it's
probably more cost prohibited than it would actually be worth
to do it, we'll simply make that division that way and require

the parties to effect whatever needs to be done to insure that
this is done in a timely fashion and that they cooperate with
each other associated with the division of those mining claims
and whatever recording is required.
We'll also grant a equal division of the water rights
on these two pieces with one caveat and that is that whatever
that division, it can't preclude the north portion of the
property from having sufficient for the maintenance of one
dwelling.

The testimony and the evidence that has come in

today appears that there's sufficient water for both portions,
but if for some reason that turns out not to be the case,
domestic water on the north portion which is presently being
used as a habitation is necessary.
Now, having followed this Exhibit 6 for purposes of a
division of the north and south property, it seems likewise
appropriate, based upon the testimony I've heard today, I've
heard no testimony to suggest that the foothill property that
is presently purposed is different in any respect, that they're
roughly equivalent.

Indeed, the testimony of somebody whose

walked the property suggests that they take the north portion
simply based upon the access and that was Mr. Wood,
accordingly, and acknowledging that based upon what evidence is
3

r.nof;^

presently in front of the Court, it appears that the north
portion of this property may have more ongoing and continual
ability to be used in some fashion as opposed to the south
portion.
The Court will also require the survey to encompass
the foothill property and divide it according to the division
as outlined in roughly equivalent fashion, in an equal fashion
based upon Exhibit 6.

I will allow a revisit however to that

property, if, after the survey is done there's some really
geographical reason why that's unfair, but not having that
evidence in front of me today, it seems to me to be an
appropriate division of the property.
Now, north, south, town, foothill, mining claims,
that leaves me with accounting.

It appears that we've had

several leases on this property over some period of time, some
as been distributed to both of the parties.

I think it

appropriate for the parties to provide an accounting.

Ms.

Atkin entered into a lease with Mr. Leo Eliopolus (?) and I'm
assuming nothing was paid on that particular lease but an
accounting should be provided by Ms. Atkin of any funds paid,
what the amount of that lease was over the period of time the
lease was in in exchange with the parties.
And Mr. Orphecio (?), I'll ask you to do the same
thing associated with the Parsons lease and the Holliger lease
so that I might go through my own sense of what an accounting
4
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1

would be. I will tell you that I will take into account the

2

fact that at some point in time these parties felt they had an

3

agreement and that's important to this Court in terms of how

4

that allocation of that accounting may have come out.

5

And I think, Ms. Atkin, in all fairness I'll tell you

6

that it's going to go against you in terms of an allocation of

7

monies, if there is an allocation to be made, simply in view of

8

the fact that we let two years go by without an executed

9

settlement agreement creating the uncertainty that ends up

10
11

being presented there today.
Finally, I'll cake a reservation of the costs on

12

attorneys' fees once I see the accounting. So I'm leaving only

13

open two issues.

14

and the second Lssue would simply be a visit or a reopener, as

15

environmental lawyers like to call it, on the issue of

16

equitable distribution of the foothill property.

17

Accounting and attorneys' fees is one issue

Now, having made those rulings based upon the

18

evidence today and my findings of roughly equivalent value, and

19

this being an equitable distribution based upon its proposal in

20

Exhibit 6, is there any issue that I've left out today?

21

MR. ?:

I think with respect to the survey, Your

22

Honor, I think that we should tie it down a little bit.

We're

23

to provide names of three surveyors within seven days, they're

24

to pick one or provide a counter list within seven days.

25

can't agree then the Court is involved and picks the surveyor

If we

5

rk r\ f- ^

off the list.
THE COURT:

Okay, that sounds like a fair resolution.

Ms. Costono indicates that: we haven't taken care of
her an indeed there's no way for this Court to take care of
you, Ms. Costono. You have a judgment.

I'm assuming that

judgment presently exists on the property in its total and
it's, you know, the long and short of it is you're a judgment
creditor of Ms. Atkin and you have some remedies.

Those

remedies exist associated with foreclosure on property or the
attachment of something of value, motile homes, anything that
may exist there.

Even mining clains that could then be sold to

Kennecott or to some other willing buyer.

There's always

somebody who has a dream that th ay may hit a goldmine in these
hills, so there maybe some pot^n:ial buyer out there.
Alright, counsel, thank you for your presentations
today, they've been very helpful to the Court.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in
rne before mentioned hearing neld before Judge Randall
Skanchy was transcribed by me from a video recording
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the
requested proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages
to the best of my ability.
Signed this 10th day of April, 2004 in Sandy,
Utah.
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Carolyn Erickson
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Certified Court Transcriber
My Commission expires May 4, 2006

NOTARY PUBLIC
CAROLYN ERICKSON
1/75 ELLEN WAY
SANOY. UT 84092
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
MAY 4. 2006
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JOSEPH F. ORIFICI (No. 6956)
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 211
Holladay, UT 84117
Telephone: (801) 272-2373
Facsimile: (801) 424-9137
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FlLLDBr

^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PATSY ATKIN,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
ORDER OF PARTITION

Defendant,

Civil No. 000300249
Judge Randall Skanchy

vs.
CATHY ATKIN,

DIANE CASTAGNO,
Indispensable Party.

)

This matter came before the Court for trial on
September 26, 2003.

The parties and their counsel were present.

Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant own approximately 250 acres

of real estate and 8 mining claims in Tooele County, Utah.

The

land and mining claims were an inheritance from the parties'
father, Morley T. Atkin.

The property is more particularly

described on Exhibit XXA" attached hereto.
2.

The Court finds that no formal survey has been

completed on any of the property.
3.

The Court orders that the property be divided as

nnocc
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proposed by Plaintiff in trial exhibit no. 6.
4.

The Court orders the property fronting Highway 36

to be divided along north-south lines, each parcel to receive
equal frontage to Highway 36.
5.

The Court orders that Plaintiff receive the south

end of the highway frontage property which encompasses the gravel
pit area.

The Court orders that the Defendant to receive the

north side of the highway frontage where she presently resides.
In addition, Defendant shall receive the 2-1/2 acre parcel at the
north tip of the property which is zoned for residential
development.
6.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's proposal (Exhibit

6) is equitable with respect to the division of the Foothill
Property.

The Court places weight on the testimony given by Dick

Wood who actually observed the topography of the Foothill
Property.

The Court reserves the right to revisit the Foothill

Property partition if necessary.
7.

The Court orders that the Settlement Canyon

Property (Mountain Property) be divided equally.

The Court

reserves the issue of whether an exchange of mining claims for
the Mountain Property is equitable.
8.

The Court orders that the parties' mining claims be

divided equally.

The Court reserves the issue of whether the

mining claims would offset the value of the Settlement Canyon

nnORK
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Property (Mountain Property) to determine if there is a more
equitable way to divide the Settlement Canyon Property.
9.

The Court orders it reserves the issue of access to

Plaintiff's property through an easement on Defendant's property
to the existing trail which leads to the mining claims until such
time as a certified survey is completed.
10.

The Court orders each party to provide the other

with an accounting of all money paid to improve and/or maintain
the property being divided so that the Court can determine
whether a monetary award is appropriate to either party.
11.

The Court orders that it is reasonable and

necessary for both parties to have equal water.
12.

The Court orders both parties to do anything

necessary to effectuate the partition of the property and water
rights ordered by this Courtf including executing titles to any
trailers and/or mobile homes or other documents.

The Court

orders that any removal of the parties' property be accomplished
in a manner that does not damage existing fixtures.
13.

The Court orders the parties to obtain a formal

survey of the property with a division as set forth herein.

Each

party is ordered to pay one-half of the expense of obtaining such
survey.
14.

The Court orders that each party receive a right

of first refusal on the sale of the property divided by this

4
Order of Partition.
15.

The Court orders that its Order of Partition

resolves all issues between the parties and Tom Eleopolus,

including

any contempt

proceedings.

DATED this _\

day of

&br$£c^

NOTICE OF MAILING
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Order of
Partition, postage prepaid, this %Q day of February, 2004,
addressed as follows:
Wesley M. Lang, Esq.
POWELL & LANG
50 South Main #850
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorney for Defendant
Cathy Atkin
22575 South Highway 36
Tooele, UT 84074
Diane Castagno
P.O. Box 39
Tooeler

UT 84074

Legal
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DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY
bravel Pit Property
A.
E

Parcel 06-0Q7-A-Q001 containing appiox. 2.488 acres.
Parcel 06-008-0-0008 containing approx. 14b.bO acres.

The tooth ill
A.

Property

Parcel 06-009-0-008 containing approximately 51 acres.

The Mount*a:... 1 ^ ^ L I I ^
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containing

approx.

26.1;

acres.
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